@INCOLLECTION{Alanen1991, author = {Alanen, Lilli}, title = {{Descartes, Conceivability, and Logical Modality}}, booktitle = {Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, year = {1991}, editor = {Horowitz, Tamara}, abstract = {This paper examines Descartes' controversial theory of the creation of eternal truths and the views of modality attributed to Descartes in recent interpretations of it. It shows why attempts to make Descartes' view intelligible by distinctions of different kinds of modality fail to do justice to his theory, which is radical indeed without being incoherent or involving universal possibilism or irrationalism. Descartes' opposition to traditional rationalist views of modality, it suggests, can be seen instead as foreshadowing contemporary views prefixed, logical structure of reality or of the divine intellect.}, keywords = {God, Modality, Science} } @INCOLLECTION{Alanen1988, author = {Alanen,Lilli}, title = {{The Foundations Of Modality And Conceivability In Descartes And His Predecessors}}, booktitle = {Modern Modalities: Studies of the History of Modal Theories from Medieval Nominalism to Logical Positivism}, publisher = {KLUWER}, year = {1988}, editor = {Knuuttila, Simo}, pages = {1-69}, abstract = {Descartes's view of modality is analyzed by contrast to two earlier models: the ancient realist one, defended by Boethius, where possibility and necessity are connected to natural potency, and the modern intensionalist one, which dissociates necessary and possible truths from any ontological foundation, treating them as conceptual, a priori given preconditions for any intellect. The emergence of this view is traced from Gilbert of Poitiers to duns Scotus, Ockham and Suarez. The Cartesian theory of the creation of eternal truths, it is argued, involves a rejection of this idea of absolute conceivability and can be seen as a constructivist view of intelligibility and rationality.} } @INCOLLECTION{Anapolitanos1991, author = {Anapolitanos, D A}, title = {{Thought Experiments and Conceivability Conditions}}, booktitle = {Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, year = {1991}, editor = {Horowitz, Tamara}, keywords = {Experiment, Mathematics, Thought} } @BOOK{Armstrong1997, title = {{A World of States of Affairs}}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1997}, author = {Armstrong, David Malet}, pages = {296}, series = {Cambridge Studies in Philosophy}, abstract = {In this study David Armstrong offers a comprehensive system of analytical metaphysics that synthesizes but also develops his thinking over the last twenty years. Armstrong's analysis, which acknowledges the 'logical atomism' of Russell and Wittgenstein, makes facts (or states of affairs, as the author calls them) the fundamental constituents of the world, examining properties, relations, numbers, classes, possibility and necessity, dispositions, causes and laws. All these, it is argued, find their place and can be understood inside a scheme of states of affairs. This is a comprehensive and rigorously this-worldly account of the most general features of reality, argued from a distinctive philosophical perspective, and it will appeal to a wide readership in analytical philosophy.}, keywords = {Causation, Laws, Metaphysics, Modality, Number, Properties, World} } @BOOK{Armstrong1989, title = {{A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility}}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1989}, author = {Armstrong, David Malet}, series = {Cambridge Studies in Philosophy}, abstract = {This book draws its inspiration from Wittgenstein's "Tractatus" and, more immediately, from an article by Skyrms. It is argued that nonactual possibilities are all and only the (fictional) recombinations of actually given elements. The elements may be nonatomic but must be wholly distinct from each other. Recombination is taken widely to include recombination and contraction of the actual. The possible is thus subordinated to the actual.}, keywords = {Logic, Mathematics, Possibility, Property, Universal} } @UNPUBLISHED{Bailey2004, author = {Andrew Bailey}, title = {{The Unsoundness of Arguments From Conceivability}}, note = {Unpublished Manuscript}, month = {March}, year = {2004}, abstract = {It is widely suspected that arguments from conceivability, at least in some of their more notorious instances, are unsound. However, the reasons for the failure of conceivability arguments are less well agreed upon, and it remains unclear how to distinguish between sound and unsound instances of the form. In this paper I provide an analysis of the form of arguments from conceivability, and use this analysis to diagnose a systematic weakness in the argument form which reveals all its instances to be, roughly, either uninformative or unsound. I illustrate this conclusion through a consideration of David Chalmers’ modal argument against physicalism.}, pdf = {Bailey, Andrew - The Unsoundness of Arguments From Conceivability.pdf}, url = {http://www.uoguelph.ca/%7Eabailey/papers/The%20Unsoundness%20of%20Arguments%20from%20Conceivability.pdf} } @ARTICLE{Balog2001, author = {Balog, Katalin}, title = {{Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics}}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2001}, volume = {62}, pages = {645-652}, number = {03}, keywords = {Conceptual Analysis, Epistemology, Ethics, Metaphysics, Physicalism} } @ARTICLE{Balog1999, author = {Balog, Katalin}, title = {{Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem}}, journal = {Philosophical Review}, year = {1999}, volume = {108}, pages = {497--528}, number = {4} } @ARTICLE{Barnes2006, author = {Barnes, Gordon}, title = {{Necessity and A Priority}}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {2006}, pdf = {Barnes, Gordon - Necessity and Apriority.pdf}, publisher = {Springer} } @ARTICLE{Barnes2002, author = {Barnes, Gordon}, title = {{Conceivability, Explanation, and Defeat}}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {2002}, volume = {108}, pages = {327--338}, abstract = {Hill and Levine offer alternative explanations of these conceivabilities, concluding that these conceivabilities are thereby defeated as evidence. However, this strategy fails because their explanations generalize to all conceivability judgments concerning phenomenal states. Consequently, one could defend absolutely any theory of phenomenal states against conceivability arguments in just this way. This result conflicts with too many of our common sense beliefs about the evidential value of conceivability with respect to phenomenal states. The general moral is that the application of such principles of explanatory defeat is neither simple nor straightforward.}, keywords = {Conceivability, Defeat, Explanation, Materialism, Metaphysics}, publisher = {Springer} } @PHDTHESIS{Barnes2000, author = {Barnes, Gordon}, title = {{Modal Inquiry: An Epistemological Study}}, school = {University of Wisconsin, Madison}, year = {2000} } @INCOLLECTION{Bealer2002, author = {Bealer, George}, title = {{Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance}}, booktitle = {{Conceivability and Possibility}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, editor = {Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne}, pages = {71--125}, address = {Oxford}, abstract = {The paper begins with a clarification of the notions of intuition (and, in particular, modal intuition), modal error, conceivability, metaphysical possibility, and epistemic possibility. It is argued that two-dimensionalism is the wrong framework for modal epistemology and that a certain nonreductionist approach to the theory of concepts and propositions is required instead. Finally, there is an examination of moderate rationalism's impact on modal arguments in the philosophy of mind--for example, Yablo's disembodiment argument and Chalmer's zombie argument. A less vulnerable style of modal argument is defended, which nevertheless wins the same anti-materialist conclusions sought by these other arguments.}, keywords = {Epistemology, Intuition, Modal, Rationalism} } @ARTICLE{Bealer2004, author = {Bealer, George}, title = {{The Origins of Modal Error}}, journal = {Dialectica}, year = {2004}, volume = {58}, pages = {11--42}, number = {1}, abstract = {Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source--namely, the failure to distinguish between metaphysical possibility and various kinds of epistemic possibility--turns out to be comparatively easy to untangle and poses little threat to intuition-driven philosophical investigation. The second source is the local (i.e., temporary) misunderstanding of one's concepts (as opposed to outright Burgean misunderstanding). This source of modal error, and our capacity to overcome it, has wide-ranging implications for philosophical method--including, in particular, its promise for disarming skepticism about the classical method of intuition-driven philosophical investigation itself. Indeed, it is shown that skeptical accounts of modal error (e.g., the accounts given by Hill, Levin, and several others) are ultimately self-defeating.}, keywords = {Epistemology, Error, Intuition, Knowledge, Modal, Possibility}, publisher = {Blackwell Synergy} } @ARTICLE{Bealer2000, author = {Bealer, George}, title = {{A Theory of the A Priori}}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {2000}, volume = {81}, pages = {1--30}, number = {1}, abstract = {The topic of a priori knowledge is approached through the theory of evidence. A shortcoming in traditional formulations of moderate rationalism and moderate empiricism is that they fail to explain why intuition and phenomenal experience count as basic sources of evidence. This explanatory gap is filled by modal reliabilism--the theory that there is a qualified modal tie between basic sources of evidence and the truth. This tie to the truth is then explained by the theory of concept possession: this tie is a consequence of what, by definition, it is to possess (i.e., to understand) one's concepts. A corollary of the overall account is that the a priori disciplines (logic, mathematics, philosophy) can be largely autonomous from the empirical sciences.}, keywords = {A Priori, Concept, Epistemology, Evidence, Intuition, Knowledge, Reliabilism}, publisher = {Blackwell Synergy} } @ARTICLE{Bealer1996, author = {Bealer, George}, title = {{A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy}}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {1996}, volume = {81}, pages = {121--142}, number = {2}, abstract = {This paper provides a defense of two traditional theses: the Autonomy of Philosophy and the Authority of Philosophy. The first step is a defense of the evidential status of intuitions (intellectual seemings). Rival views (such as radical empiricism), which reject the evidential status of intuitions, are shown to be epistemically self-defeating. It is then argued that the only way to explain the evidential status of intuitions is to invoke modal reliabilism. This theory requires that intuitions have a certain qualified modal tie to the truth. This result is then used as the basis of the defense of the Autonomy and Authority theses. The paper closes with a defense of the two theses against a potential threat from scientific essentialism}, keywords = {A Priori, Autonomy, Empiricism, Epistemology, Evidence, Intuition, Knowledge}, publisher = {Springer} } @ARTICLE{Brendel2004, author = {Brendel, Elke}, title = {{Intuition Pumps and the Proper Use of Thought Experiments}}, journal = {Dialectica}, year = {2004}, volume = {58}, pages = {89--108}, abstract = {I begin with an explication of "thought experiment". I then clarify the role that intuitions play in thought experiments by addressing two important issues: (1) the informativeness of thought experiments and (2) the legitimacy of the method of thought experiments in philosophy and the natural sciences. I defend a naturalistic account of intuitions that provides a plausible explanation of the informativeness of thought experiments, which, in turn, allows thought experiments to be reconstructed as arguments. I also specify criteria for distinguishing bad "intuition pumps" from legitimate thought experiments. These criteria help us to avoid being seduced by the dangerous suggestive power of misleading intuitions.}, keywords = {Epistemology, Experiment, Intuitionism, Thought}, publisher = {Blackwell Synergy} } @ARTICLE{Brueckner2001, author = {Brueckner, Anthony}, title = {{Chalmers’s Conceivability Argument for Dualism}}, journal = {Analysis}, year = {2001}, volume = {61}, pages = {187--93}, number = {3}, abstract = {In The Conscious Mind, D. Chalmers appeals to his semantic framework in order to show that conceivability, as employed in his "zombie" argument for dualism, is sufficient for genuine possibility. I criticize this attempt.}, keywords = {Consciousness, Dualism, Metaphysics, Mind, Possibility}, publisher = {Blackwell Synergy} } @ARTICLE{Bueno2000, author = {Bueno, Otavio and Shalkowski, Scott A.}, title = {{A Plea for a Modal Realist Epistemology}}, journal = {Acta Analytica}, year = {2000}, volume = {24}, pages = {175--194}, abstract = {In this paper we examine Lewis's attempts to provide an epistemology of modality and we argue that he fails to provide an account that properly weds his metaphysics with an epistemology that explains the knowledge of modality that both he and his critics grant. We argue that neither the appeals to acceptable paraphrases of ordinary modal discourse nor parallels with Platonistic theories of mathematics suffice. We conclude that no proper epistemology for modal realism has been provided and that one is needed.}, keywords = {Epistemology, Modality, Platonism, Realism} } @INCOLLECTION{Casullo2005, author = {Casullo, Albert}, title = {{Knowledge and Modality}}, booktitle = {{Encyclopedia of Philosophy}}, publisher = {Macmillan}, year = {2005}, editor = {Donald Borchert}, address = {New York}, edition = {Second} } @BOOK{Casullo2003, title = {{A Priori Justification}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2003}, author = {Casullo, Albert}, address = {Oxford}, abstract = {Casullo argues that epistemologists should recognize the role that empirical evidence plays in resolving these fundamental issues. He concludes by proposing that traditional approaches to the a priori, which focus primarily on the concepts of necessity and analyticity, are misguided and essentially limited. Compelling and original, A Priori Justification should generate a reassessment of these fundamental questions among scholars interested in the theory of knowledge.}, isbn = {0195304187}, keywords = {A Priori, Epistemology. Experience, Justification, Knowledge} } @ARTICLE{Casullo2000, author = {Casullo, Albert}, title = {{Modal epistemology: Fortune or virtue?}}, journal = {The Southern Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {38}, pages = {17--25}, keywords = {A Priori, Epistemology, Fortune, Knowledge, Modality, Virtue}, publisher = {Memphis State University, Department of Philosophy} } @ARTICLE{Casullo1979, author = {Casullo, Albert}, title = {{Reid and Mill on Hume's Maxim of Conceivability}}, journal = {Analysis}, year = {1979}, volume = {39}, pages = {212--219}, number = {4}, abstract = {Hume's maxim consists of two principles which are logically independent of each other: (1) whatever is conceivable is possible; and (2) whatever is inconceivable is impossible. Thomas Reid offered several arguments against the former principle, while John Stuart mill argued against the latter. The primary concern of this paper is to examine whether Reid and mill were successful in calling Hume's maxim into question.}, keywords = {Conceivability, Language, Possibility}, publisher = {JSTOR} } @ARTICLE{Casullo1975, author = {Casullo, Albert}, title = {{Conceivability and Possibility}}, journal = {Ratio}, year = {1975}, volume = {17}, pages = {118-121}, abstract = {The purpose of this article is to defend Hume's claim that whatever is conceivable is possible from a criticism by William Kneale. Kneale argues that although a mathematician can conceive of the falsehood of the Goldbach conjecture, he does not conclude that it is not necessarily true. The author suggests that by taking into account Hume's distinction between intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, a revised version of his claim can be offered which is not open to Kneale's criticism.}, keywords = {Conceivability, Metaphysics, Nature, Necessity} } @INCOLLECTION{Chalmers2002a, author = {Chalmers, David}, title = {{Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?}}, booktitle = {{Conceivability and Possibility}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, editor = {Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne}, pages = {145--200}, abstract = {This paper addresses the epistemology of modality, and argues for a sort of modal rationalism (a priori access to modality). It distinguishes a number of sorts of conceivability, and with these distinctions in hand argues that certain sorts of conceivability plausibly entail sorts of possibility. The second half of the paper addresses potential gaps between the two, and gives a positive argument for modal rationalism. Lots of interesting issues come up along the way.} } @ARTICLE{Cohnitz2002, author = {Cohnitz, Daniel}, title = {{Modal Skepticism: Philosophical Thought Experiments and Modal Epistemology}}, journal = {Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook}, year = {2002}, volume = {10}, pages = {281--296}, abstract = {One of the most basic methods of philosophy is, and has always been, the consideration of counterfactual cases and imaginary scenarios. One purpose of doing so obviously is to test our theories against such counterfactual cases. Although this method is widespread, it is far from being commonly accepted. Especially during the last two decades it has been confronted with criticism ranging from complete dismissal to denying only its critical powers to a cautious defense of the use of thought experiments as counterexamples. One of the strongest criticisms of the method of thought experimentation is "modal skepticism" as explicated and defended by Peter van Inwagen. Van Inwagen argues that the philosopher's notion of logical possibility is confused and that its epistemology is dubious. I argue that van Inwagen's skepticism is unwarranted. There is a sufficiently clear notion of logical possibility and a sufficiently straightforward way of getting to know what is logically possible. In the remainder of the paper I show how that connects with the methodology of thought experimentation in philosophy}, publisher = {Kluwer} } @INCOLLECTION{Currie2002, author = {Currie, Gregory}, title = {{Desire in Imagination}}, booktitle = {{Conceivability and Possibility}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, editor = {John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler}, pages = {201--221}, keywords = {Desire, Imagination, Imagining} } @INCOLLECTION{Della2002, author = {Della Rocca, Michael}, title = {{Essentialism vs. Essentialism}}, booktitle = {{Conceivability and Possibility}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, editor = {Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne}, pages = {223--252}, abstract = {I argue that the key motivation for the essentialist is that modal intuitions, such as "Humphrey might have won", are not to be explicated in terms of persons in other possible situations who are similar to the actual Humphrey. However, because of a need to preserve the necessity of identity, the essentialist must claim that certain other intuitions (such as "Hesperus might not have been Phosphorus") have to be understood in terms of similarity (as in Kripke) or have to be rejected (as in Yablo). This move leads to ineliminable doubts about the essentialist's rejection of similarity, and so it leads to an undermining of the motivation for essentialism itself.} } @INCOLLECTION{Fine2002, author = {Fine, Kit}, title = {{The Varieties of Necessity}}, booktitle = {{Conceivability and Possibility}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, editor = {John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler}, pages = {253--281}, abstract = {It is argued that there are three main forms of necessity--the metaphysical, the natural and the normative--and that none of them is reducible to the others or to any other form of necessity. In arguing for a distinctive form of natural necessity, it is necessary to refute a version of the doctrine of scientific essentialism; and in arguing for a distinctive form of normative necessity, it is necessary to refute certain traditional and contemporary versions of ethical naturalism.}, keywords = {Metaphysics, Natural, Necessity, Normative} } @ARTICLE{Fine1994, author = {Fine, Kit}, title = {{Essence and Modality}}, journal = {Philosophical Perspectives}, year = {1994}, volume = {8}, pages = {1-16} } @INCOLLECTION{Forrest2001, author = {Forrest, Peter}, title = {{Counting the Cost of Modal Realism}}, booktitle = {Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, year = {2001}, editor = {Preyer, Gerhard}, pages = {93--103}, abstract = {Conceivability is, I say, prima facie evidence for possibility. Hence, we may count the cost of theories about possibility by listing the ways in which, according to the theory in question, something conceivable is said nonetheless to be impossible. More succinctly we may state a principle, Hume's razor to put alongside Ockham's. Hume's razor says that necessities are not to be multiplied more than necessary. In this paper I count the cost of David Lewis's modal realism, showing that many of the objections are replied to by Lewis only at the cost of multiplying necessities.}, keywords = {Modal, Realism} } @ARTICLE{Geirsson2005, author = {Geirsson, Heimir}, title = {{Conceivability and Defeasible Modal Justification}}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {2005}, volume = {122}, pages = {279--304}, number = {3}, abstract = {This paper advances the thesis that we can justifiably believe philosophically interesting possibility statements. The first part of the paper critically discusses van Inwagen's skeptical arguments while at the same time laying some of the foundation for a positive view. The second part of the paper advances a view of conceivability in terms of imaginability, where imagining can be propositional, pictorial, or a combination of the two, and argues that conceivability can, and often does, provide us with justified beliefs of what is metaphysically possible. The notion of scenarios is developed, as is an account of how filling out scenarios can uncover a defeater or, in many cases, strengthen the justification for the relevant possibility statement.}, pdf = {Geirsson, Heimir - Conceivability and Defeasible Modal Justification.pdf}, publisher = {Springer} } @INCOLLECTION{Gendler2002, author = {Gendler, Tamar Szabo; Hawthorne, John}, title = {{Introduction: Conceivability and Possibility}}, booktitle = {{Conceivability and Possibility}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, editor = {John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler}, pages = {1--70}, abstract = {To what extent and how is conceivability a guide to possibility? This essay explores general philosophical issues raised by this question, and critically surveys responses to it by Descartes, Hume, Kripke and "two-dimensionalists."}, keywords = {Conceivability, Possibility} } @ARTICLE{Gertler2002, author = {Gertler, Brie}, title = {{Explanatory Reduction, Conceptual Analysis, and Conceivability Arguments about the Mind}}, journal = {Nous}, year = {2002}, volume = {36}, pages = {22--49}, number = {1}, abstract = {This paper defends the use of conceptual arguments in the philosophical debate between reductionists and antireductionists about the mental. I argue that most of the disputants, including Joseph Levine, Ned Block, Robert Stalnaker, and (even) Frank Jackson, underestimate the contribution that conceptual facts make to justifying explanatory reductions. I then furnish an account of that contribution, and trace the consequences of this account for conceivability arguments about the mind. I conclude that the viability of reductionism must be decided on conceptual grounds and that, therefore, conceivability arguments are crucially important in evaluating materialism about the mind.}, keywords = {Conceivability, Conceptual Analysis, Explanation, Metaphysics, Mind, Reduction} } @PHDTHESIS{Hagen2006, author = {Hagen, Jason}, title = {{Modal Epistemology: Conceivability and Consistency}}, school = {Purdue University}, year = {2006} } @ARTICLE{Hale2003, author = {Hale, Bob}, title = {{Knowledge of Possibility and of Necessity}}, journal = {Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society}, year = {2003}, volume = {103}, pages = {1--20}, abstract = {I investigate two asymmetrical approaches to knowledge of absolute possibility and of necessity--one which treats knowledge of possibility as more fundamental, the other according epistemological priority to necessity. Two necessary conditions for the success of an asymmetrical approach are proposed. I argue that a possibility-based approach seems unable to meet my second condition, but that on certain assumptions--including, pivotally, the assumption that logical and conceptual necessities, while absolute, do not exhaust the class of absolute necessities--a necessity-based approach may be able to do so.}, keywords = {Absolute, Epistemology, Knowledge, Necessity, Possibility}, publisher = {Aristotelian Society} } @INCOLLECTION{Hetherington1991, author = {Hetherington, Stephen Cade}, title = {{Conceivability and Modal Knowledge}}, booktitle = {Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, year = {1991}, editor = {Horowitz, Tamara}, abstract = {I argue for an analysis of conceivability as a form of modal knowledge: to conceive of p's being true is to know that "Possibly, p" is true.}, keywords = {Experiment, Knowledge, Modality, Thought} } @INCOLLECTION{Hill2006, author = {Hill, Christopher}, title = {{Modality, Modal Epistemology, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness}}, booktitle = {The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretense, Possibility, and Fiction}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2006}, editor = {Shaun Nichols} } @ARTICLE{Hill1998, author = {Hill, Christopher}, title = {{Chalmers on the a Priority of Modal Knowledge}}, journal = {Analysis}, year = {1998}, volume = {58}, pages = {20--26} } @ARTICLE{Hill1997, author = {Hill, Christopher}, title = {{Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem}}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {1997}, volume = {87}, pages = {61-85} } @BOOK{Jackson1998, title = {{From Metaphysics to Ethics: a Defense of Conceptual Analysis}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Jackson, Frank} } @ARTICLE{Jones2004, author = {Jones,Janine}, title = {{Illusory Possibilities and Imagining Counterparts}}, journal = {Acta Analytica}, year = {2004}, volume = {19}, pages = {19-43}, number = {32}, abstract = {Given Kripke's semantic views, a statement, such as 'water is H2O', expresses a necessary a posteriori truth. Yet it seems that we can conceive that this statement could have been false; hence, it appears that we can conceive impossible states of affairs as holding. Kripke used a de dicto strategy and a de re strategy to address three illusions that arise with respect to necessary a posteriori truths: (1) the illusion that a statement, such as 'Water is H2O', possibly expresses a falsehood, (2) the illusion that conceivability can fail to latch on to a genuine metaphysical possibility, and (3) the illusion that one can access a real metaphysical possibility by conceiving that water is not H2O. In this paper I argue that while Kripke's de dicto strategy dispels (1), his strategies do not enable him to dispel (2) and (3).}, keywords = {Epistemology, Illusion, Possibility, Semantics, Truth} } @ARTICLE{Kail2003, author = {Kail,Peter}, title = {{Conceivability and Modality in Hume: A Lemma in an Argument in Defense of Skeptical Realism}}, journal = {Hume Studies}, year = {2003}, volume = {29}, pages = {43--61}, number = {1}, abstract = {This paper examines the ramifications of Hume's view of the relation of conceivability to metaphysical possibility. It argues that the limitations Hume places of the representations involved in moves to conceivability to metaphysical possibility preclude any straightforward argument against full-blooded causal realism in Hume from conceivability. Furthermore, our finding certain states of affairs conceivable when they are not metaphysically possible is perfectly compatible with the thrust of the causal realist position.}, keywords = {Conceivability, Epistemology, Modality, Realism, Scepticism} } @BOOK{Kripke1980, title = {{Naming and Necessity}}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1980}, author = {Kripke, Saul} } @UNPUBLISHED{Kung2005, author = {Kung, Peter}, title = {{Imaginability as a Guide to Possibility, Part II}}, note = {Unpublished Manuscript}, year = {2005}, pdf = {Kung, Peter - Imaginability as a Guide to Possibility, Part II.pdf}, url = {http://pages.pomona.edu/%7Epfk04747/cpsem/Kung%20imaginability%20as%20a%20guide%20to%20possibility%20II%20draft%2003-09-05.pdf} } @UNPUBLISHED{Kung2005a, author = {Kung, Peter}, title = {{Imaginability as a Guide to Possibility}}, note = {Unpublished Manuscript}, year = {2005}, pdf = {Kung, Peter - Imaginability as a Guide to Possibility.pdf}, url = {http://pages.pomona.edu/%7Epfk04747/cpsem/Kung%20imaginability%20as%20a%20guide%20to%20possibility%20draft%2003-03-05.pdf} } @PHDTHESIS{Kung2002, author = {Kung, Peter}, title = {{Imagination and Modal Epistemology}}, school = {New York University}, year = {2002} } @ARTICLE{Law2004, author = {Law, Stephen}, title = {{Loar's Defence of Physicalism}}, journal = {Ratio}, year = {2004}, volume = {17}, pages = {60-67}, number = {1}, abstract = {Brian Loar believes he has refuted all those antiphysicalist arguments that take as their point of departure observations about what is or isn't conceivable. I argue that there remains an important, popular and plausible-looking form of conceivability argument that Loar has entirely overlooked. Though he may not have realized it, Saul Kripke presents, or comes close to presenting, two fundamentally different forms of conceivability argument. I distinguish the two arguments and point out that while Loar has succeeded in refuting one of Kripke's arguments he has not refuted the other. Loar is mistaken: physicalism still faces an apparently insurmountable conceptual obstacle.}, keywords = {Conceivability, Metaphysics, Pain, Physicalism} } @ARTICLE{Levine1998, author = {Levine, Joseph}, title = {{Conceivability and the Metaphysics of Mind}}, journal = {Nous}, year = {1998}, volume = {32}, pages = {449--480}, number = {4}, keywords = {Conceivability, Materialism, Metaphysics, Mind, Nature} } @INCOLLECTION{Lewis2006, author = {Lewis, David}, title = {{Elusive Knowledge}}, booktitle = {Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology: Volume 2}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2006}, note = {Cambridge Studies in Philosophy}, isbn = {0521587875} } @BOOK{Lewis2000, title = {{On the Plurality of Worlds}}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {2000}, author = {Lewis, David}, isbn = {0631224262} } @ARTICLE{Lightner1997, author = {Lightner, Tycerium}, title = {{Hume on Conceivability and Inconceivability}}, journal = {Hume Studies}, year = {1997}, volume = {23}, pages = {113--132}, number = {1} } @BOOK{Loux1979, title = {{The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality}}, publisher = {Cornell University Press}, year = {1979}, author = {Loux, Michael}, isbn = {0801491789} } @ARTICLE{Machan1969, author = {Machan, Tibor R}, title = {{Note On Conceivability And Logical Possibility}}, journal = {Kinesis}, year = {1969}, volume = {2}, pages = {39--42}, abstract = {A. Collins once argued that time travel is only imaginable if we relate the "event" out of context. John Hospers argues that it is logically possible for an iron bar to float in water even if it is actually (empirically) impossible. My point in this piece is that Hospers relies on viewing the floating out of context, in Walt Disney fashion; but that is no way to establish any kind of possibility. I also discuss "conceivability", a term frequently used either to clarify logical possibility or to interchange for the same. I argue that it cannot do either.}, keywords = {Conceivability, Epistemology, Imaginability, Possibility} } @ARTICLE{MacPherson1997, author = {MacPherson, Brian}, title = {{A Challenge to the Kripke/Putnam Distinction between Epistemic and Metaphysical Necessity}}, journal = {Southwest Philosophy Review}, year = {1997}, volume = {13}, pages = {113--128}, number = {2}, abstract = {I argue that the account of the epistemic modalities developed by Kripke and Putnam is incomplete since it does not make use of the possible worlds machinery that is indispensable to their analysis of the metaphysical modalities. It would have been simpler and more elegant if they had used the concept of 'possible world' to explain both modalities. Instead, they provide an explication of the epistemic modalities in terms of the vague concepts of conceivability and revisability. I show that logical omniscience as a consequence of a possible worlds analysis of the epistemic modalities can be made palatable.}, keywords = {Epistemology, Necessity, Semantics} } @ARTICLE{Manfredi2000, author = {Manfredi, Pat}, title = {{The Compatibility of a Priori Knowledge and Empirical Defeasibility: a Defense of a Modest a Priori}}, journal = {Southern Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {38}, pages = {179-189}, note = {Spindel Supplement}, keywords = {A-Priori, Epistemology, Justification, Knowledge} } @ARTICLE{Marcus2004, author = {Marcus, E.}, title = {{Why Zombies are Inconceivable}}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2004}, volume = {82}, pages = {477-490}, abstract = {I argue that zombies are inconceivable. More precisely, I argue that the conceivability-intuition that is used to demonstrate their possibility has been misconstrued. Thought experiments alleged to feature zombies founder on the fact that, on the one hand, they must involve first-person imagining, and yet, on the other hand, cannot. Philosophers who take themselves to have imagined zombies have unwittingly conflated imagining a creature who lacks consciousness with imagining a creature without also imagining the consciousness it may or may not possess.}, keywords = {Functionalism, Metaphysics, Physicalism, Thought-Experiment, Zombie} } @BOOK{Marcus1993, title = {{Modalities: Philosophical Essays}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1993}, author = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan} } @ARTICLE{Marcus1983, author = {Marcus, Ruth Barcan}, title = {{Rationality and Believing the Impossible}}, journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1983}, volume = {80}, pages = {321-338}, number = {6} } @ARTICLE{Markie2000, author = {Markie, Peter}, title = {{Modest a Priori Knowledge and Justification}}, journal = {Southern Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {38}, pages = {179-189}, note = {Spindel Supplemen}, keywords = {A-Priori, Epistemology, Justification, Knowledge} } @INCOLLECTION{Massey1991, author = {Massey, Gerald J}, title = {{Backdoor Analycity}}, booktitle = {Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy}, publisher = {Rowman and Littlefield}, year = {1991}, editor = {Horowitz, Tamara}, abstract = {When they abandoned the analytic-synthetic distinction, analytic philosophers substituted for it uncritical appeals to thought experiments or conceivability arguments. Although the history of philosophy is replete with thought experiments, medieval and early modern philosophers developed sophisticated theories concerning what governs what happens in thought experiments. By contrast, contemporary philosophers subscribe to the thesis of facile conception according to which casual allegations of conceivability or inconceivability are taken as good evidence of possibility or impossibility. Philosophers need to adopt standards of thought experimentation like those found in science and to ground them in a general theory of conceivability.}, keywords = {Analysis, Empiricism, Experiment, Thought} } @ARTICLE{McLeod2005, author = {McLeod, Stephen}, title = {{Recent Work on Modal Epistemology}}, journal = {Philosophical Books}, year = {2005}, volume = {46}, pages = {235--245} } @INCOLLECTION{Menzies1998, author = {Menzies, Peter}, title = {{Possibility and Conceivability: A Response-Dependent Account of Their Connections}}, booktitle = {European Review of Philosophy, Volume 3: Response-Dependence}, publisher = {Stanford}, year = {1998}, editor = {Casati, Roberto}, pages = {255--277}, abstract = {In the history of modern philosophy systematic connections were assumed to hold between the modal concepts of logical possibility and necessity and the concept of conceivability. However, in the eyes of many contemporary philosophers, insuperable objections face any attempt to analyze the modal concepts in terms of conceivability. It is important to keep in mind that a philosophical explanation of modality does not have to take the form of a reductive analysis. In this paper I attempt to provide a response-dependent account of the modal concepts in terms of conceivability along the lines of a nonreductive model of explanation.}, keywords = {Conceivability, Possibility, Response Dependence} } @ARTICLE{Miscevic2003, author = {Miscevic, Nenad}, title = {{Explaining Modal Intuition }}, journal = {Acta Analytica}, year = {2003}, volume = {18}, pages = {5--41}, abstract = {The paper defends causal explanationism concerning our modal intuitions and judgments, and, in particular, the following claims. If a causally explainable mirroring or "pre-established harmony" between our mind and modal reality obtains, we are justified in believing it does. We do not hold our modal beliefs compulsively and blindly but with full subjective and objective justification. Therefore, causal explanation of our modal beliefs does not undermine rational trust in them. Explanation and trust support each other. In contrast, antiexplanationists (from Kant, through neo-Wittgensteinians to T. Nagel and J. Pust), claim that causal explanation of intuitions and judgments undermines rational trust in them.}, keywords = {Belief, Epistemology, Explanation, Intuition, Modality} } @ARTICLE{Miscevic2000, author = {Miscevic, Nenad}, title = {{Intuition as a Second Window}}, journal = {Southern Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2000}, volume = {38}, pages = {87-112}, note = {Spindel Supplement}, keywords = {Belief, Epistemology, Intuition, Knowledge} } @ARTICLE{Murphy2006, author = {Murphy, Peter}, title = {{Reliability Connections Between Conceivability and Inconceivability}}, journal = {Dialectica}, year = {2006}, volume = {60}, pages = {195--205} } @ARTICLE{Nagel1998, author = {Nagel, Thomas}, title = {{Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem}}, journal = {Philosophy}, year = {1998}, volume = {73}, pages = {337-352} } @ARTICLE{Pap1943, author = {Pap, A.}, title = {{On the Meaning of Necessity}}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1943}, volume = {40}, pages = {449--458}, number = {17}, publisher = {JSTOR} } @INCOLLECTION{Peacocke1985, author = {Peacocke, Christopher}, title = {{Imagination, Experience, and Possibility: A Berkeleian View Defended}}, booktitle = {Essays on Berkeley}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1985}, editor = {John Foster and Howard Robinson}, isbn = {0198244800} } @ARTICLE{Peacocke2002, author = {Peacocke, Christopher}, title = {{Principles for Possibilia}}, journal = {Nous}, year = {2002}, volume = {36}, pages = {486--508} } @ARTICLE{Peacocke2002a, author = {Peacocke, Christopher}, title = {{The Principle-Based Account of Modality: Elucidations and Resources}}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {2002}, volume = {64}, pages = {663--679} } @ARTICLE{Peacocke2001, author = {Peacocke, Christopher}, title = {{The Past, Necessity, Externalism and Entitlement}}, journal = {Philosophical Books}, year = {2001}, volume = {42}, pages = {106--117} } @BOOK{Peacocke1999, title = {{Being Known}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {1999}, author = {Peacocke, Christopher} } @ARTICLE{Peacocke1997, author = {Peacocke, Christopher}, title = {{Metaphysical Necessity: Understanding, Truth and Epistemology}}, journal = {Mind}, year = {1997}, volume = {106}, pages = {521-574} } @BOOK{Perry2003, title = {{Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness}}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2003}, author = {Perry, John}, series = {Jean Nicod Lectures} } @ARTICLE{Placek2007, author = {Tomasz Placek and Thomas Müller}, title = {{Counterfactuals and Historical Possibility}}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2007}, volume = {154}, pages = {173--197}, number = {2}, month = {January}, pdf = {Placek, Tomasz - Counterfactuals and historical possibility.pdf} } @BOOK{Plantinga2003, title = {{Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2003}, editor = {Matthew Davidson}, author = {Plantinga, Alvin} } @ARTICLE{Prudovsky1995, author = {Prudovsky, Gad}, title = {{Arguments from Conceivability}}, journal = {Ratio}, year = {1995}, volume = {8}, pages = {63--69}, number = {1}, abstract = {What can be inferred from the fact that something is, or is not, conceivable? In this paper I argue, contrary to some deflationary remarks in recent literature, that arguments which use such facts as their starting point may have significant philosophical import. I use Strawson's results from the first chapter of "Individuals" in order to show that Galileo's arguments in favor of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, which are based on premises concerning conceivability, should not be dismissed: they are the first step towards recognizing an important conceptual truth.}, keywords = {Conceivability, Motion, Science, Truth} } @ARTICLE{Prust2004, author = {Prust, Joel}, title = {{On Explaining Knowledge of Necessity}}, journal = {Dialectica}, year = {2004}, volume = {58}, pages = {71--87}, number = {1} } @UNPUBLISHED{Roca2006, author = {Roca, Sonia}, title = {{The (A)(B)(C) of Modal Epistemology: a Further Attempt to Meet the Epistemic Challenge}}, note = {Unpublished Manuscript}, year = {2006}, abstract = {This paper is about the epistemic challenge for mind-independence approaches of modality. The challenge is to elucidate the possibility conditions for modal knowledge, and arises from acceptance of the following three premises: (a) We have modal knowledge (which, for a mind-independence theorist is knowledge of the extra-mental world); (b) Any knowledge of the extra-mental world is grounded on causal affection; and (c) Any knowledge grounded on causal affection cannot outrun knowledge of mere truths (as opposed to modal truths). Most attempts to solve the challenge (Peacocke’s, Yablo’s and Chalmers’ among them), try to do so by denying premise (b). Here, reasons are given to doubt about the adequacy of such a strategy, and it is suggested that a better way of solving the challenge is by qualifying the acceptance of (b) as well as by denying (c).}, pdf = {Roca, Sonia - The (a)(b)(c) of Modal Epistemology - A Further Attempt to Meet the Epistemic Challenge.pdf}, url = {http://www.ub.es/tif/2006/papers/roca.pdf} } @INCOLLECTION{Rosen2002, author = {Rosen, Gideon}, title = {{A Study in Modal Deviance}}, booktitle = {{Conceivability and Possibility}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, editor = {John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler}, pages = {283--307}, keywords = {Conceivability, Deviance, Modality} } @INCOLLECTION{Sidelle2002, author = {Sidelle, Alan}, title = {{On the Metaphysical Contingency of Laws of Nature}}, booktitle = {{Conceivability and Possibility}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, editor = {John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler}, pages = {309--336}, abstract = {This paper defends the traditional view that the laws of nature are contingent, or, if some of them are necessary, this is due to analytic principles for the individuation of the law-governed properties. Fundamentally, I argue that the supposed explanatory purposes served by taking the laws to be necessary (at least, understood metaphysically, as opposed to semantically)--showing how laws support counterfactuals, how properties are individuated, or how we have knowledge of properties--are in fact undermined by the continued possibility of the imagined scenarios--this time, described neutrally--which seemed to disprove the claim to necessity in the first place. I speculate that this will be true for any proposed necessary a posteriori truths, and is a basis for rejecting their supposed metaphysical significance.}, keywords = {Contingency, Metaphysics, Natural Law} } @ARTICLE{Skolnick2005, author = {Skolnick, Deena and Bloom, Paul}, title = {{What Does Batman Think About SpongeBob? Children’s Understanding of the Fantasy/Fantasy Distinction}}, journal = {Cognition}, year = {2005}, volume = {20}, pages = {1--10}, publisher = {Elsevier Science} } @INCOLLECTION{Sorensen2002, author = {Sorensen, Roy}, title = {{ The Art of the Impossible }}, booktitle = {{Conceivability and Possibility}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, editor = {John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler}, pages = {337--368}, abstract = {But a winner must supply a nonevasive picture with no limit on potential detail--a purely imagistic depiction that does not rely on a mere description of an impossibility. There are logical minded philosophers from David Hume to Saul Kripke who think the prize cannot be won: What is conceivable is possible and whatever is depicted is thereby conceived, therefore, impossibilities cannot be depicted. Yet there is a rich aesthetics of inconsistency, best known through M. C. Escher. So I proceed with the fine print for the competition.}, keywords = {Impossibility, Logic, Visual} } @INCOLLECTION{Sosa2002, author = {Sosa, Ernest}, title = {{Reliability and the A Priori}}, booktitle = {{Conceivability and Possibility}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, editor = {John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler}, pages = {369--384}, keywords = {A Priori, Knowledge, Mathematics, Reliability} } @ARTICLE{Sosa1996, author = {Sosa, Ernest}, title = {{Rational Intuition: Bealer on its Nature and Epistemic Status}}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {1996}, volume = {81}, pages = {151--162}, abstract = {A discussion of George Bealer's conception and defense of rational intuition as a basis of philosophical knowledge, under three main heads: a) the phenomenology of intellectual intuition; b) the status of such intuition as a basic source of evidence, and the explanation of what gives it that status; and c) the defense of intuition against those who would reject it and exclude it on principle from the set of valid sources of evidence.}, keywords = {Epistemology, Intuition, Knowledge, Philosophy, Rationality} } @INCOLLECTION{Stalnaker2002, author = {Stalnaker, Robert}, title = {{What Is it Like to Be a Zombie?}}, booktitle = {{Conceivability and Possibility}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, editor = {John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler}, pages = {385--400}, keywords = {Metaphysics, Possibility, Zombie} } @ARTICLE{Stoljar2001, author = {Stoljar, Daniel}, title = {{The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical}}, journal = {Philosophical Perspectives}, year = {2001}, volume = {15}, pages = {393-413} } @ARTICLE{Tidman1996, author = {Tidman, Paul}, title = {{The Justification of A Priori Intuitions}}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56}, pages = {161--171}, number = {1}, keywords = {A Priori, Epistemology, Intuition, Justification, Knowledge, Luck} } @ARTICLE{Tidman1994, author = {Tidman, Paul}, title = {{Conceivability as a Test for Possibility}}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {1994}, volume = {31}, pages = {297–309}, number = {4} } @ARTICLE{Tidman1994a, author = {Tidman, Paul}, title = {{Logic and Modal Intuitions}}, journal = {Monist}, year = {1994}, volume = {77}, pages = {389-398}, number = {3}, keywords = {Epistemology, Intuition, Logic, Modal} } @ARTICLE{Tidman1993, author = {Tidman, Paul}, title = {{The Epistemology of Evil Possibilities}}, journal = {Faith and Philosophy}, year = {1993}, volume = {10}, pages = {181-197}, number = {2}, abstract = {In this paper I defend the Anselmian conception of God as a necessary being who is necessarily omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good against arguments that attempt to show that we have good reason to think there are evil possible worlds in which either God does not exist or in which He lacks at least one of these attributes. I argue that the critics of Anselmianism have failed to provide any compelling reason to think such worlds are possible. The best the critic of Anselmianism can achieve is a stand-off of competing modal intuitions. I conclude by suggesting some ways of resolving such a stand-off in favor of the Anselmian view.}, keywords = {Evil, Possibility, God, Omnipotence, Religion, World} } @ARTICLE{Vahid2006, author = {Vahid, H.}, title = {{Conceivability and possibility}}, journal = {Philosophical Explorations}, year = {2006}, volume = {9}, pages = {243--260}, number = {3}, publisher = {Taylor \& Francis} } @ARTICLE{Van1983, author = {Van Cleve, James}, title = {{Conceivability and the Cartesian Argument for Dualism}}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {1983}, volume = {64}, pages = {34-45} } @ARTICLE{Van1998, author = {Van Inwagen, Peter}, title = {{Modal Epistemology}}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {1998}, volume = {92}, pages = {67--84}, abstract = {Many important metaphysical arguments validly deduce an actuality from a possibility. For example: Because it is possible for me to exist in the absence of anything material, I am not my body. I argue that there is no reason to suppose that our capacity for modal judgment is equal to the task of determining whether the "possibility" premise of any of these arguments is true. I connect this thesis with Stephen Yablo's recent work on the epistemology of modal statements.}, keywords = {A Priori, Epistemology, Knowledge, Modal, Possibility} } @INCOLLECTION{Williams2006, author = {Williams, Bernard}, title = {{Imagination and the Self}}, booktitle = {Problems of the Self}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2006}, pages = {26-45}, edition = {New}, isbn = {0521290600} } @ARTICLE{Woolhouse1972, author = {Woolhouse, Roger S}, title = {{From Conceivability To Possibility}}, journal = {Ratio}, year = {1972}, volume = {14}, pages = {144--154}, abstract = {It is often supposed that in order to refute the view that laws of nature are necessary truths it is sufficient to appeal to Hume's argument from the conceivability of to the possibility of their being false. But while Hume's argument does present the necessitarian with insuperable difficulties it needs to be made clear just what these are. The mere appeal to Hume is quite insufficient for what he says can be interpreted in more than one way. And if it constitutes an argument rather than a mere assertion Kneale has given reason to suppose that it is at least not obviously valid. The upshot of this article is that Hume's argument may be seen as a direct challenge to the notion that there could be propositions whose modal value is necessarily "opaque to the human intellect".}, keywords = {Epistemology, Natural Law, Possibility} } @ARTICLE{Worley2003, author = {Worley, Sara}, title = {{Conceivability, Possibility, and Physicalism}}, journal = {Analysis}, year = {2003}, volume = {63}, pages = {15-23}, keywords = {Conceivability, Metaphysics, Physicalism, Possibility, Zombie} } @INCOLLECTION{Wright2002, author = {Wright, Crispin}, title = {{The Conceivability of Naturalism}}, booktitle = {{Conceivability and Possibility}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, editor = {John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler}, pages = {401--439}, keywords = {Conceivability, Naturalism} } @INCOLLECTION{Yablo2002, author = {Yablo, Stephen}, title = {{Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda}}, booktitle = {{Conceivability and Possibility}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2002}, editor = {John Hawthorne and Tamar Gendler}, pages = {441--492}, keywords = {Naming, Possibility, Probability, Rationalism} } @ARTICLE{Yablo2000, author = {Yablo, Stephen}, title = {{Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts}}, journal = {Pacific Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {2000}, volume = {81}, pages = {98--122}, number = {1}, abstract = {Kripke, argued like this: it seems possible that E; the appearance can't be explained away as really pertaining to a "presentation" of E; so, pending a different explanation, it is possible that E. Textbook Kripkeans see in the contrast between E and its presentation intimations of a quite general distinction between two sorts of meaning. E's secondary or a posteriori meaning is the set of all worlds w which E, as employed here, truly describes. Its primary or a priori meaning is the set of all w such that if w is actual, then E is true. "Conceivability error" occurs when a primary possibility is mistaken for a secondary one. Textbook Kripkeanism is rejected on the grounds that it makes meaning too modal and modality too much a matter of meaning.}, keywords = {A Priori, Concept, Consciousness, Meaning, Metaphysics, Modality, Semantics} } @ARTICLE{Yablo1996, author = {Yablo, Stephen}, title = {{How in the World?}}, journal = {Philosophical Topics}, year = {1996}, volume = {24}, pages = {255-286} } @ARTICLE{Yablo1993, author = {Yablo, S.}, title = {{Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?}}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1993}, volume = {53}, pages = {1--42}, number = {1}, pdf = {Yablo, Stephen - Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility.pdf}, publisher = {International Phenomenological Society} } @BOOK{DePaul1998, title = {{Rethinking Intuition: the Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry}}, publisher = {Rowman \& Littlefield}, year = {1998}, editor = {William DePaul and Michael Ramsey} } @BOOK{Nichols2003, title = {{The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction}}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2003}, editor = {Nichols, Shaun}, pages = {290} }