While driving Izzy and friend to see Disney on Ice I overheard the following conversation from the back-seat.
Ellery: What does your daddy do?Izzy: He's a philosopher.
Ellery: (long pause) What do philosophers do?
Izzy: They grade papers... oh and think about stuff. Mostly they just grade papers though.
I had to laugh because there are those days when what Izzy said seems all too true.
August 18-20, 2009
VU University Amsterdam
the Netherlands
Keynote Speakers
Robert Audi (University of Notre Dame)
Richard Feldman (University of Rochester)
Bruce Russell (Wayne State University)
Conference Theme
The ethics of belief and the phenomenon of disagreement are two epistemological topics that show an interesting revival during the last few decades. This conference aims to draw the two issues together: What is it to acquire or hold responsible belief on some issue if that issue is the subject of (fierce) controversy? How does the existence of (known) disagreement affect the epistemic status of our beliefs? And what sort of cognitive response is appropriate when one is confronted with opposed views on a subject matter considered?
Background
This is the second Amsterdam-based conference organized by the Knowledge, Belief, and Normativity project run by René van Woudenberg, Duncan Pritchard, and Igor Douven. The first conference in Amsterdam was held in 2007. The project is funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).
Announcement
The Student Session of the 21st European Summer School in Logic, Language and Information will take place in Bordeaux, France from July 20 to July 31. We invite submission of papers in the areas of logic and computation, logic and language, and language and computation, for presentation at the Student Session and for appearance in the proceedings.
The aim of the Student Session is to give undergraduate, masters, and doctoral students the chance to present their work. In addition, each paper is reviewed by three specialists in the field, which gives authors useful feedback regardless of whether the paper is accepted.
As in previous years, Springer is offering Euro 1000 in prizes. Euro 500 in Springer textbooks will go to first prize, and Euro 250 will go to each of two runners-up.
Thursday
II-D Author Meets Critics: Jonathan Sutton, Without Justification
9:00am-Noon
Chair: E.J. Coffman (University of Tennessee)
Critics: Earl Conee (University of Rochester)
Jennifer Lackey (Northwestern University)
Matthew McGrath (University of Missouri-Columbia)
Author: Jonathan Sutton (Auburn University)
Friday
II-G Colloquium: Rationality
9:00-10:00am
Chair: Baron Reed (Northwestern University)
Speaker: Berislav Marusic (Brandeis University)
"Epistemic Evasion"
Commentator: Brian Boeninger (University of Notre Dame)
10:00-11:00am
Chair: Chris Waterhouse (University of St. Andrews)
Speaker: Daniel M. Johnson (Baylor University)
"Proper Function and Should-Be-Believed Defeaters"
Commentator: Warren E. Shrader (Indiana University-South Bend)
11:00am-Noon
Chair: Matthew Mullins (Northwestern University)
Speaker: Paul Weirich (University of Missouri)
"Calibration"
Commentator: Arthor Paul Pedersen (Carnegie Mellon University)
III-E Colloquium: Knowledge and Value
1:45-2:45pm
Chair: Remy Debes (University of Memphis)
Speaker: Adam Pelser (Baylor University)
"Emotional Knowledge: Emotion as a Basic Source of Justification"
Commentator: Jay Wood (Wheaton College)
2:45-3:45pm
Chair: Evan Fales (University of Iowa)
Speaker: Allan J. Hazlett (Fordham University)
"Is Knowledge Something Everyone Wants?"
Commentator: Daniel Howard-Snyder (Western Washington University)
3:45-4:45pm
Chair: Mylan Engel, Jr. (Northern Illinois University)
Speaker: Sarah Wright (University of Georgia)
"Virtue Epistemology and Contextualism"
Commentator: Noah Lemos (College of William and Mary)
III-I Colloquium: Foundations of Knowledge
1:45-2:45pm
Chair: Jeffrey E. Brower (Purdue University)
Speaker: Todd Long (California Polytechnic State University)
"A Bone for Traditional Foundationalism"
Commentator: Mark Heller (Sryacuse University)
2:45-3:45pm
Chair: Giovanni Mion (Southern Methodist University)
Speaker: Julianne Chung (University of Calgary)
"The Assumptions Account of Knowledge Attributions"
Commentator: Kelly M. Becker (University of New Mexico)
3:45pm-4:45pm
Chair: Aloysius P. Martinich (University of Texas-Austin)
Speaker: Robert Bass (Coastal Carolina University)
"Knowledge Without Truth?"
Commentator: Gerald Vision (Temple University)
Saturday
IV-C Author Meets Critics: Michael Bergmann, Justification without Awareness
9:00am-Noon
Chair: Matthia Steup (Purdue University)
Critics: Richard Fumerton (University of Iowa)
John Greco (Saint Louis University)
Joel Prust (University of Delaware)
Authors: Michael Bergmann (Purdue University)
V-G Colloquium: Reliabilism
2:30-3:30PM
Chair: Alexander Arnold (University of Notre Dame)
Speaker: Victor Kumar (University of Arizona)
"Kinds of Reliability"
Commentator: Nathan Ballantyne (University of Arizona)
3:30-4:30pm
Chair: Andrew Bailey (University of Notre Dame)
Speaker: Chris Tucker (Stonehill College)
"Greco's Reliability Requirement"
Commentator: Thomas D. Senor (University of Arkansas)
4:30-5:30pm
Chair: Ryan Doran (Northwestern University)
Speaker: Mark E. Wunderlich (Union College)
"Avoiding the Generality Problem for Process Reliabilism"
Commentator: John Shoemaker (University of Rochester)
I've often been disposed to think that most people are natural dualists when it comes to the mind/body question. My daughter, at the tender age of four, is proving to be something of a natural materialist. Her materialism frequently results in humorous remarks. Consider this nugget. Yesterday my daughter was extolling the virtues of several recipes I could prepare for a visit from the grandparents. To close the conversation she chirped "So keep those recipes in your brain Dad!" Of course, the common saying is to "keep in mind" but she's apparently decided to dispose with such folk concepts as the mind!
It's the time of year when I start getting emails from prospective grad students asking about Northwestern's Philosophy department. While I typically don't mind replying to the emails, it is a busy time of year right now. In an attempt to save my self some time I thought I'd post my replies to some of the typical questions that I get. It should go without saying, but the views expressed below are my own and should in no way be seen as being endorsed or approved by the department or university.
Lately I've been thinking a lot about peer disagreement. Basically the question to be answered is; what does rationality require when we come to find out that we disagree with someone who we take to be our epistemic peer? There are two prevailing ways in which philosophers have responded to this question. There are the conformist who recommend that we adjust our beliefs in the direction of our peers, and the non-conformist who insist that no adjustment is required. It will come as no surprise to those that know me, but I'm a non-conformist. Of course, all of this is simply a setup for me to point out that Dave Mason has been a non-conformist for years! In fact, he may have written non-conformism's theme song "We Just Disagree".
So let's leave it alone, 'cause we can't see eye to eye.
There ain't no good guys, there ain't no bad guys.
There's only you and me and we just disagree.
Ooo - ooo - ooohoo oh - oh - o-whoa
Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois. Rank open, tenured or tenure-track, beginning fall quarter, 2009. Multiple positions possible. 4 courses/year spread over 3 quarters, undergraduate and graduate Thesis supervision. Usual non-teaching duties. AOS: Metaphysics or Epistemology or Philosophy of Language or Philosophy of Mind (including Philosophy of Cognitive Science). AOC: Open.Salary Competitive. AA/EOE. Women and members of minority groups are encouraged to apply. Junior candidates should submit complete CV, three letters of recommendation, and writing sample; senior candidates should submit complete CV along with list of references. Send application materials to Search Committee 1, Department of Philosophy, Northwestern University, Kresge 2-335, 1880 Campus Drive, Evanston, IL 60208. Candidates whose materials are received by November 15, 2008 will get primary consideration.
http://www.wcas.northwestern.edu/epistemology/employment.html
Getting through graduate school with a child presents some unique challenges, but it also has a few great upsides. One of those upsides is the amount of time you get to spend with your child in comparison to your friends doing the daily grind of a 9-5. The area where we live has a walk score of 85, which my daughter Izzy and I take advantage of most days. I've learned this year that, apparently, one of the favorite occupations of four-year-olds is near constant conversation. Sometimes these conversations are a bit one sided, stream of consciousness, affairs. However, she can also be very introspective and earnest. Almost always, though, she talks with the gesturing habits of an Italian butcher.
One of the things that's interesting about talking to a four-year-old is that they can hit on some philosophically interesting topics. For example, there was the discussion that come out of Izzy's proclaiming that God couldn't exist because he doesn't have a body. I'm constantly amazed at how much of a materialist she can be. This afternoon, as we walked a couple of blocks to meet my wife, Izzy began talking to me about her brain. Specifically about how her memories are in her brain. I don't know why, but I was a bit surprised that she said 'brain' and not 'mind'. So, I began asking her questions like "Are all your thoughts in your brain?" Her response was a seemingly certain yes. She said some part were for memories, but other parts did other work. I tried to ask her about qualia. She thought it was just to have your brain be a certain way, though she confessed to not really understanding how.
I was having a good deal of fun with the philosophy of mind discussion, so I thought I'd push on the personal identity. I asked her, "What would happen if we switched our brains? That is, what would happen if we put your brain in my body and my brain in your body?" Her response... "That's absurd!" (I'm always surprised by some of the words she uses.) I told her that probably more than a few philosophers agreed with her, but to try and imagine it in any case. We had to set a side the fact that her brain is smaller than mine, and that mine wouldn't fit in her body. In the end she concluded that she'd see out of my body and I'd see out of hers. I wanted to press her on fission cases, but sadly we'd arrived at her mother's hair salon. Apparently hair products and chocolates are serious distractions to doing philosophy.
Andrew delivers a new desktop wallpaper with a Lewisian theme, which got me thinking modally. Here is a send up to Hilary Putnam and his Twin Earth argument. Of course philosophers will know that this wallpaper will need to be run on anything but ubuntu. So, if you're running Windows, get yourself a nice ubuntu theme to go with this wallpaper.
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