Goldman on The Simulation Theory of Mindreading, originally uploaded by Matthew Mullins. Alvin Goldman (Rutgers) came and gave a talk tonight on the simulation theory of mindreading. This is the second time I've seen Goldman give a talk and as last time he seemed to have twice as much material as he had time. The talk was in connection with his recently published book, Simulating Minds. Other than providing a sketch of simulation theory and the competing theory theory, Goldman spent the bulk of his talk on the supporting evidence for the theory. This then was certainly not the typical type of talk one sees from a top philosopher. No arguments from the armchair, instead there was lots of data and citations of studies.]]> I'll confess that I found Goldman's two-level approach to simulation theory compelling, though I'm admittedly a neophyte when it comes to the debate. Goldman's view distinguishes low-level simulation processes that involve the likes mirror neurons from high-level processes such as perspective taking or imagination. Low-level simulation refers to those simulation processes that happen at the subconscious level. Some of the evidence for these processes comes from the studies of macaque monkeys, which have evidenced the existence of mirror neurons in the premotor cortex. These mirror neurons are those that fire both when the monkey performs an action and when the monkey observes the same action performed by another animal. Hence the mirroring, the neuron "mirrors" the behavior of the observed as though the observer were itself performing the action. There is evidence to suggest that humans have mirror neurons too. High-level simulation involves imagination or perspective taking. We have interesting case studies of individuals who have had particular structures of the brain destroyed such that they fail to process certain data in accord with the norm. For example there are certain people who don't experience fear because their amygdale has been damaged. What turns out to be an interesting correlation is that not only do these people fail to experience fear, but they cannot recognize it in others. In one case the individual reported no fear when hanging from a helicopter hunting in Siberia, and further, the individual couldn't distinguish a fearful scream from a laughing one. Goldman's argument then is that these people lack the appropriate cognitive makeup to be able to simulate what others are experiencing. One of the interesting upshots of Goldman's argument would seem to be that cognitive aliens wouldn't be able to engage in mindreading. So much for all of that science fiction literature! After the talk we had a nice intimate dinner at Anna Belle's in downtown Lexington. (Nice Dinner = Filet Mignon + 12yo Macallan Single Malt) Besides the killer food and atmosphere I had the opportunity to meet the fascinating Lisa Zunshine. She grabbed all of the philosophers' attention when she begged our indulgence in asking a couple of questions about Naming and Necessity. When someone in the English department takes it upon themselves to read Kripke they garner some serious street cred. Turns out she specialized in Cognitive Cultural Studies. Basically Zunshine works at the intersection of cognitive science and literature. So she writes interesting stuff on subjects like the theory of mind and the novel. I'm looking forward to her forthcoming book, Strange Concepts and the Stories They Make Possible.
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